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Abstract
This article examines the relationships among parent firm technological knowledge, parent–IJV product relatedness, parent control over the
IJV, and IJV survival. Combining the knowledge-based perspective and institutional theory, we argue that parent control itself does not necessarily
lead to higher IJV survival; it contributes to IJV survival when the parent firm has a high level of technological knowledge, and when the IJV is
product-related to this parent. Results obtained from 1038 Japanese IJVs based in China indicate that both equity control and managerial control of
a Japanese parent had a positive interaction effect, with the parent's technological knowledge, on IJV survival. Equity control also exhibited a
positive interaction effect with product relatedness. In a sub-sample of 354 Sino–Japanese IJVs containing local parent information, managerial
control by the Chinese parent was found to have a positive interaction effect, with Chinese parent–IJV product relatedness, on IJV survival.
© 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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Research on the international joint venture (IJV) has
proliferated in the past two decades. Many factors have been
attributed to the success or failure of this organizational form.
Among these, technological knowledge of parent firms, product
relatedness between parent firms and their IJV, and parent firm
control over an IJV, have received extensive attention (Gatignon
and Anderson, 1988; Inkpen and Beamish, 1997; Luo, 1997,
2002; Lyles and Salk, 1996; Si and Bruton, 2005). The
possession of proprietary technological knowledge has been
considered as an important competitive advantage enjoyed by
multinational enterprises (MNEs) (Dunning, 1993; Delios and
Beamish, 1999). Product relatedness between parent firms and
their IJVensures that the IJV receives knowledge that is directly
relevant to its businesses (Li, 1995; Luo, 2002). These two
factors were found to have a positive effect, respectively, on IJV
performance and survival (Chang, 1996; Lu and Hébert, 2005;
Luo, 2002; Lyles and Salk, 1996).
On the other hand, empirical research concerning the impact
of parent control over an IJV has mixed results (Yan and Zeng,
1999). Despite of the assumptions of some researchers in
international management that dominant control by one parent
is critical to the stability of IJVs (Killing, 1983), other studies
led to contrary evidence. For instance, Harrigan (1988) found
that shared ownership, as apposed to dominant equity control,
was more conducive to the success of joint ventures. Still, other
researchers argue that the relationship between parent control
and IJV performance is dependent on the type of control exerted
and a number of contingency factors (Chang and Taylor, 1999;
Geringer and Hébert, 1989; Lu and Hébert, 2005).
This article examines the relationships among technological
knowledge, product relatedness, parent control, and IJV survival
by combining the knowledge-based perspective and institutional
theory. Parent control can be seen as a mechanism for institu-
tionalizing parent firm rules and practices at an IJV, a process
that facilitates the transfer and internalization of parent firm
knowledge. As such, control alone does not necessarily lead to
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higher IJV performance or survival; instead, it has an interaction
effect, with parent firm technological knowledge and parent–
IJVrelatedness, respectively, on IJV performance. Data obtained




The knowledge-based view (Steensma and Lyles, 2000)
draws from related perspectives such as the resource-based view
(Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984), core competence (Prahalad
and Hamel, 1890), and organizational learning (Fiol and Lyles,
1985; Levitt and March, 1988). The core argument in these
streams of literature is that technological knowledge is a critical
intangible asset that can generate economic rents to the firm that
possesses it. This perspective corresponds well to the long-held
view within international management that the possession of,
and ability to transfer, proprietary know-how confer an advan-
tage to an MNE over its local competitors (Caves, 1971;
Dunning, 1993; Gupta and Govindarajan, 1991, 2000; Kogut
and Zander, 1993). Empirical research has supported a positive
relationship between the level of proprietary knowledge, either
technological or otherwise, and foreign subsidiary performance
(Delios and Beamish, 2001; Makino and Delios, 1996; Shrader,
2001).
The argument is particularly strong when the overseas sub-
sidiary is an IJV situated in a transitional or emerging economy
(Lane et al., 2001; Lyles and Salk, 1996). Due to the large
technological gap between MNEs and local firms (Caves, 1974;
Meyer, 2004), IJVs established by foreign and domestic firms in
those markets rely largely on the technological and managerial
support provided by foreign parents (Steensma and Lyles, 2000).
The transfer of advanced technological knowledge from parent
firms situated in developed countries to their IJVs in developing
countries should enhance the competitiveness of these ventures.
IJVs also benefit from contributions made by their local
parents (Luo, 1997). The joint venture organizational form
provides a means for MNE to internalize local knowledge
(Beamish and Banks, 1987; Hennart, 1988). Research on
foreign direct investments (FDIs) indicates that foreign entrants
to developed markets have received technological spillover
benefits from local firms (Driffield and Munday, 2000; Liu
et al., 2000). In developing countries, however, contributions
from local partners may typically include knowledge on the
local market and resources, access to distribution channels, and
good relationships with suppliers, buyers, and governmental
agencies responsible for the specific industry (Beamish, 1993;
Gomes-Casseres, 1989). Thus an IJV can potentially achieve a
competitive advantage from two sources, namely both the
foreign and local parents.
1.2. Product relatedness
Product relatedness is an important determinant of knowl-
edge transferred between organizational units. Research
suggests that within a firm, product relatedness enhances
sharing of relevant and valuable knowledge between different
divisions (Porter, 1987). Emphasizing the capacity of the
knowledge recipient, Cohen and Levinthal (1990) argued that
learning performance is the greatest when the object of learning
is related to what is already known. These views can be ex-
tended to research on MNEs, and especially on the relationship
between an IJV and its parent firms.
Empirical studies on MNEs have shown that foreign sub-
sidiaries that diversify into product areas outside the parents'
business domains are more likely to exit due to a lack of
industry-specific knowledge or mismatch of resources (Chang,
1996; Li, 1995). Specific to joint ventures, Merchant and
Schendel (2000) found a positive effect on firm value arising
from the relatedness between an IJV and its US-based parent
firm. In two studies by Luo (1997, 2002) on Sino–foreign joint
ventures, local parent–IJV relatedness also exhibited a positive
effect on IJV performance. From a legitimacy perspective, Lu
and Xu (2006) found a positive association between foreign
parent–IJV relatedness and IJV performance for Sino–Japanese
joint ventures in China. In general, this stream of research has
suggested that foreign parent–IJV relatedness and local parent–
IJV relatedness can contribute to IJV performance or survival
respectively or jointly.
1.3. Parent control
Control refers to the process by which one entity influences
the behavior and output of another (Geringer and Hébert, 1991;
Ouchi, 1977). Control has been an important topic in research
on IJVs because, by definition, an IJV involves at least two
parent organizations and is technically autonomous from both.
The relative level of control by either parent has implications for
the protection, transfer, and acquisition of contributed knowl-
edge between the partners (Makhija and Ganesh, 1997; Inkpen
and Beamish, 1997). As the pooling of resources and acqui-
sition of knowledge are typical reasons for the formation of an
IJV, successful transfer of one partner's own intellectual prop-
erty without unwanted dissemination risks and smooth acqui-
sition of the other partner's know-how, are directly linked to the
survival or failure of an IJV (Yan, 1998).
Although control is an important determinant of IJV per-
formance, studies on control present conflicting arguments and
results for the control–performance relationship. The contro-
versy centered largely on the dominant versus balanced control
over the IJV. While some researchers argued and found that a
dominant structure would minimize difficulties in managing
an IJV arising from parental conflicts (Killing, 1983), others
believed only equal power between the partners would lead to
mutual satisfaction (Harrigan, 1988). Empirically, Bleeke and
Ernst (1991) found that dominant foreign parent control had a
negative impact on the performance of IJVs in less developed
countries. In a comprehensive review on this subject, Geringer
and Hébert (1989) pointed out that most studies on this issue
had been limited to a direct test on the control–performance
relationship without considering contingency factors. Since
then, researchers have looked into these various contingency
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relationships (Lu and Hébert, 2005; Luo et al., 2001; Yan and
Gray, 1994).
The different types of control are another issue concerning
control in the IJV. Some studies on control have focused on
equity ownership (Gatignon and Anderson 1988; Hennart 1988;
Pan, 1996) as a proxy for control. Others have explicitly con-
trasted different types of control, for example, overall versus
specific (Luo et al., 2001;Mjoen and Tallman, 1997), and formal
versus informal (Makhija and Ganesh, 1997). The focus in this
paper is on equity control and managerial control. Research has
suggested that these are two distinct forms of control (Beamish,
1993;Mjoen and Tallman, 1997). Equity ownershipwas equated
with control, as voting rights in the board of a joint venture are
usually in proportion to equity shares that each parent holds
(Mjoen and Tallman, 1997; Steensma and Lyles, 2000). Because
of the power vested in the board, this control is commonly
considered as “overall” or “strategic”. Managerial control refers
to control exercised by key managerial personnel over the daily
operations of an IJV. For foreign parents, this control is typically
achieved through the use of expatriates sent from the
headquarters to various host countries (Beamish and Inkpen,
1998; Delios and Bjorkman, 2000; Legewise, 2002).
1.4. Hypotheses
Following previous studies (Luo et al., 2001; Lu and Hébert,
2005), we consider a contingency approach in examining the
role of parent control in IJV performance. The basic theme is
that valuable and relevant knowledge possessed by the parent
firm, if matched with appropriate control mechanisms, will lead
to higher IJV survival (Fig. 1). Before presenting contingency
arguments, however, this article first formulates two base
hypotheses, on the knowledge–performance relationship, to
align this study with extant research (Luo, 2002; Steensma and
Lyles, 2000). We consider two constructs, technological
knowledge and product relatedness, to capture valuable and
relevant knowledge. The knowledge-based perspective sees
technological know-how of parent firms, especially the foreign
parents of IJVs in developing countries, as valuable contributed
asset to be transferred to IJVs (Lane et al., 2001; Steensma and
Lyles, 2000). Product relatedness ensures that the knowledge to
be transferred is relevant to the IJV's businesses. Thus both
technological knowledge and parent–IJV relatedness contribute
to IJV survival.
Hypothesis 1. Technological knowledge of a parent firm has a
positive effect on IJV survival.
Hypothesis 2. Product relatedness between a parent firm and
its IJV has a positive effect on IJV survival.
The study then combines the knowledge-based perspective
with institutional theory in generating the major theoretical
arguments of this study. Institutional theory emphasizes the role
of legitimacy in supporting the operations of business
organizations (Suchman, 1995; Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002).
An organization that lacks social legitimacy and institutional
support may have a higher rate of failure, although it may be run
efficiently from an economic perspective (DiMaggio and
Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977). The institutional
perspective has been applied to research in international
management and the multinational enterprise (Rosenzweig
and Singh, 1991; Westney, 1993). Recent years witness a shift
in attention by researchers from a foreign subsidiary's external
isomorphic pressures to the concurrent consideration of its
internal legitimacy requirements: A foreign subsidiary is
expected to conform to the rules and norms of its parent firm
in order to receive legitimacy and resource support from the
latter (Hillman and Wan, 2005; Kostova, 1999).
As a special type of foreign subsidiary, an IJV involves two
functioning parent firms, and has to rely on resource contri-
butions, either tangible or intangible, from both parents. Thus an
IJV needs to secure legitimacy and support from both parents.
Yet institutional theory suggests that, because two parents
represent two different sets of institutional rules and norms of
their respective countries, isomorphism, and hence legitimacy,
with one of the parents implies non-conformity to, and lack of
legitimacy with, the other parent (Lu and Xu, 2006). In order to
ensure that an IJV remains a “legitimate” sub-unit of its own, a
parent will likely impose its own rules and norms on the IJV
through coercive isomorphism and regulative institutional
processes (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 1995).
Equity control and managerial control by a parent represent
one source of such coercive pressures exerted on an IJV. Equity
holding in a joint venture ensures that a parent has contractual
rights to determine the structure, process, and behavior of an
IJV in a way consistent with the parent's own strategic goals.
This is usually achieved through the appointment of board
members and high-level executives (Child et al., 1997; Mjoen
and Tallman, 1997). Managerial control achieves the same
Fig. 1. A contingency model of IJV survival.
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objectives through the monitoring of daily routines of an IJV.
The physical presence of parent-appointed managers will exert
powerful influences on the personnel at an IJV, forcing, per-
suading, or inviting them (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) to meet
the expectations of the parent (Boyacigiller, 1990; Chang and
Taylor, 1999; Delios and Bjorkman, 2000).
Parent control in an IJV, however, does not necessarily lead
to a definitive performance consequence because of the unique
dual-parent structure of an IJV and its related legitimacy
implications. Although an IJV that is under equity or managerial
control by a parent firm will conform to the rules and norms of
this particular parent, and thus enjoy legitimacy and support
from this parent, the effect of such control on the relationship
between the IJVand the other parent is likely to be negative due
to the different legitimacy requirements between the two parents
(Lu and Xu, 2006). Thus the overall effect of control on IJV
performance by one of the parents is theoretically unpredictable,
and hence the conflicting results in extant research.
Nevertheless, through these equity and managerial control
mechanisms, a parent firm can ensure that its contributions to an
IJV, especially technological knowledge, will be properly uti-
lized to achieve its own objectives. Tighter control will also
enable a parent to protect its technological intellectual property
against opportunistic behavior on the part of the other partner
(Hennart, 1988), and ensure that such technological know-how
can be transferred smoothly to the IJV (Lu and Hébert, 2005).
These objectives can be achieved not only through formal
equity control mechanisms, but also through the institutional-
ization of managerial rules, norms, and processes at the IJV to
make them more aligned with those of the parent (Kostova,
1999; Makhija and Ganesh, 1997).
A logical extension of this analysis is that, when the value of
technological assets of a parent firm is high, or in other words,
when the IJV depends largely on a parent's technologies for
survival, control by this parent becomes a performance-enhancing
factor, because it ensures the successful transfer and internaliza-
tion of these valuable technologies at the IJV. Although control
itself has mixed performance implications, technological knowl-
edge and control together will lead to higher survivability of the
IJV. When a parent does not possess such technological knowl-
edge, on the other hand, high control by this parent will not
contribute to the transfer of proprietary knowledge. On the
contrary, high equity shares and excessive use of its own man-
agers by this parent might cause institutional conflicts between
the partners (Lu and Xu, 2006), thus interfering the successful
transfer of valuable knowledge to the IJV from the other parent.
Hypothesis 3a. Technological knowledge of a parent firm and
equity control by this parent over the IJV has a positive interaction
effect on IJV survival.
Hypothesis 3b. Technological knowledge of a parent firm and
managerial control by this parent over the IJV has a positive
interaction effect on IJV survival.
In a similar vein, when an IJV is product-related to a parent
firm, or in other words, when the core competence of a parent
firm is directly relevant to an IJV's businesses, control by this
parent also plays a role in boosting IJV performance, because it
ensures the transfer of relevant knowledge and practices to the
IJV. Conversely, if an IJV falls outside a parent's product do-
mains, control exerted by this parent will not lead to desired
economic results, since the parent has no useful, industry-
specific knowledge or experience to transfer. In the worst sce-
nario, the “experience” that this parent imposes on the IJV may
even cause a negative performance consequence when applied to
a different external environment (Levinthal and March, 1993).
Hypothesis 4a. Product relatedness between a parent firm and
the IJV, and equity control by this parent over the IJV, has a
positive interaction effect on IJV survival.
Hypothesis 4b. Product relatedness between a parent firm and
the IJV, and managerial control by this parent over the IJV, has a
positive interaction effect on IJV survival.
2. Method
2.1. Sample and data sources
This study used a sample of Japanese IJVs in China to imple-
ment empirical investigation. China has become the world's
largest recipient of FDI in recent years, while Japan is a major
source of outward FDI. Since 1996, China has been home to
40% of Japan's annual outflows of foreign investment, and 70%
of Japanese FDIs in China were established as joint ventures
with Chinese firms (Beamish et al., 1997; Lu, 2000). In addition,
significant differences exist in the institutional environments in
which the Japanese and Chinese firms are embedded, one being
a developed country, the other an emerging market. Such dif-
ferences between the foreign and local parents' home institutions
present an ideal setting for a study on the role of institutional
influences in IJVs.
Data were obtained on Japanese IJVs in China, and on the
Japanese and Chinese parents. The source of information for the
Japanese IJVs in China is Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyou Souran,
Kuni-Betsu. This source is published annually by Toyo Keizai
Inc., a large Japanese compiler and publisher of business-level,
statistical and economic information. The data reported in
Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyou Souran was based on responses to
questionnaires sent to all firms listed on Japanese stock ex-
changes, as well as to major unlisted firms. The coverage of this
information is close to the population of foreign subsidiaries for
Japanese firms that responded to the survey (Beamish et al.,
1997). For this study, editions from 1986 to 2001 were used to
develop a longitudinal database of Japanese IJVs in China.
The main source of Japanese parent company information is
the Nikkei NEEDS tapes, an electronic database compiled by
Nihon Keizai Shinbun-sha, one of the largest compilers and
publishers of statistical and corporate information in Japan.
This database provides financial information on all Japanese
firms listed on the Tokyo stock exchange. The Nikkei NEEDS
tapes report detailed firm-level information compiled from the
firm's financial statements as well as include some supplemen-
tary data. Annual information can be traced since 1964 from
this database, which provides information on more than 3000
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publicly listed Japanese firms. Where required, additional
parent company information was gathered from the Analysts'
Guide, the GlobalVantage database, and various editions of the
Japan Company Handbook, all of which have coverage of
parent firms similar to those in the Nikkei NEEDS tapes.
Information on the Chinese partners was obtained from
Wanfang Data Company (www.wanfangdata.com.cn), a Beij-
ing-based business information provider under China's Ministry
of Science and Technology. Wanfang's Chinese Enterprises and
Companies Database was started in 1988 as a joint effort
between Wanfang and dozens of other information service
providers. Currently this database contains information on about
200,000 Chinese firms in 96 industries. Its data are included in
the DIALOG online systems (www.dialog.com). Wanfang's
data were collected through multiple means, including printed
materials, telephone surveys, and mailed questionnaires. The
assignment of SIC codes to the firms was done by specialists
based on verbal descriptions obtained. Information in Wan-
fang's databases is updated annually.
2.2. Variables
2.2.1. Dependent variable
IJV survival is the dependent variable for this study. Exits
were identified by comparing preceding editions of Kaigai
Shinshutsu Kigyou Souran with later editions. The earliest
edition used is 1986, and the latest edition is 2001. Exits were
coded as 1, and surviving IJVs were coded as 0. The duration of
an IJV was computed as the number of years from its foundation
to the year of its exit or to the year of 2001. The exit year is the
year that a joint venture was de-listed in the database. Although
one could not equate exit completely with failure, one could
expect that an IJV would remain in operation as long as the IJV
mode represented the most efficient organizational form
(Inkpen and Beamish, 1997). Empirical evidence from prior
studies also suggests that survival correlates positively with
financial and satisfaction measures of performance (Geringer
and Hébert, 1989).
2.2.2. Independent variables
Technological knowledge of Japanese parents was measured
by R&D intensity, which is computed as R&D expenditure as a
percentage of total sales. For Japanese parent–IJV relatedness,
a dummy variable was used to indicate whether the 2-digit SICs
of an IJV matched any of the 2-digit SICs of the Japanese parent
at the time of IJV foundation, following Li (1995). If an overlap
in the IJV and its Japanese parent's SICs was detected, the
variable would be assigned a value of 1. Similarly, a dummy
variable was used to indicate whether the 2-digit SICs of an IJV
matched any of the 2-digit SICs of the Chinese parent at the time
of IJV foundation. The variable, Chinese parent–IJV related-
ness, took a value of 1 if an overlap in the IJV and the Japanese
parent's SICs was found.
We operationalized equity control of the Japanese parent as
the percentage of equity shares owned by Japanese parents in an
IJV, and managerial control as the percentage of Japanese
expatriates in the total employment of an IJV. Although detailed
information on these expatriates is not available, one can rea-
sonably assume that they either held key managerial positions at
IJVs or controlled core technological know-how transferred
from parent firms, thus exerting important influences on the
processes and operations of IJVs (Peterson et al., 1996; Xu
et al., 2004). We did not include separate measures for equity
and managerial controls of the Chinese parents because these
are the opposite of Japanese equity shares and Japanese expa-
triate ratios. The more a Japanese parent's control, the less a
Chinese parent's control over the IJV, and vice versa.
2.2.3. Control variables
Three measures were included to account for the major
factors at the IJV level that could affect IJV survival. They are
IJV size (measured as total number of employees), the industry
in which the IJV operates (a set of industry dummies based on
2-digit industry codes), and IJV location (a dummy variable
which we gave a value of 1 if the IJV was located in either a
special economic zone or an open coastal city). The control
variable for the Japanese parent was its size, which was com-
puted as the number of employees. For the sub-sample with
information on Chinese parent firms, two more control variables
were included. They are the size of the Chinese parent (as
measured by the number of employees) and its ownership type
(coded 1 if it is a state-owned enterprise).
2.3. Analysis
To minimize the sample bias towards exits arising from the
intrinsic instability in the initial years of IJV operation (Nitsch
et al., 1996; Li, 1995; Park, and Russo, 1996), the sample
was restricted to IJVs that were at least two years old. After
matching the parent information to subsidiary information and
deleting cases with missing values, we had a sample of 1038
Sino–Japanese IJVs. For the hypotheses concerning local parent
firms, a sub-sample of 354 Sino–Japanese IJVs was used, a
reduction from the full sample due to missing information on the
Chinese partners.
Cox's proportional hazard model (Cox and Oakes, 1984)
was used to test the hypotheses. This model estimates the
influence of explanatory variables (or covariates) on the hazard
of exit without specifying a parametric form for the precise time
to failure. Instead, the procedure ranks ventures in terms of the
sequence of exit and maximizes the partial likelihood that the
ith venture should exit conditional on the characteristics of
the other ventures at risk at the time of exit. By incorporating the
age distribution directly into the estimation, the Cox regression
procedure corrects the problems of censored data and aging
effects on IJV dissolution and brings the exit rate closer to
failure rate (Li, 1995).
3. Results
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and a correlation
matrix for the study's variables. The descriptive statistics show
that the average numbers of employees are about 10,000 for the
Japanese partner, 16,000 for the Chinese partner, and 250 for the
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IJVs. On average, the equity ownership of Japanese parents is
between 55% (sub-sample) and 62% (full sample). 73% of the
IJVs are in the same 2-digit SICs as the Japanese parents in
the sub-sample. In contrast, only 38% of the IJVs are within the
Chinese parents' 2-digit SIC industries. Finally, 69% of the
Chinese partners are state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The mag-
nitude of the correlations between variables is in the range of
low to medium, suggesting that multicollinearity was not a
serious problem in the hypothesis-testing procedure.
Fourteen regressions test the hypotheses: six for the full
sample of Japanese IJVs in China and eight for the sub-sample
with information on Chinese partners. The results of these
regressions are displayed in Tables 2 and 3. All models are
significant. For the interpretation of the results, a negative coef-
ficient estimator suggests an increase in the survival rate of IJVs
or a reduction in the exit rate.
Model 1 in both tables is the baseline model, which only
include the five control variables and the set of industry dum-
mies (not reported here). Model 1 of Table 3 includes size and
ownership type controls for the Chinese parents. In both tables,
IJV size as measured by the number of employees enhances the
survival chances of the IJVs. The level of Japanese parents'
equity ownership has no effect on the survival of IJVs. However,
the level of Japanese expatriates (as a percentage of total em-
ployment of IJVs) increases the likelihood of exit in the full
sample. In the sub-sample with Chinese parent characteristics,
Chinese parent size as measured by the number of employees
enhances the survival chances of the IJVs.
Model 2 adds to Model 1 Japanese parents' technological
knowledge variable to test Hypothesis 1. As shown in both Tables
2 and 3, the coefficient estimates for Japanese parents'
technological knowledge are negative, suggesting that Japanese
parents' technological knowledge enhances IJV survival. How-
ever, these coefficient estimates are not statistically significant.
Hence, Hypothesis 1 is not supported. Since we did not have
information on the technological knowledge level of the Chinese
parents, we did not test Hypothesis 1 with respect to the Chinese
parents.
Model 3 tests Hypothesis 2 by adding Japanese parent–IJV
product relatedness to the baseline models. As shown in both
tables, Japanese parent–IJV relatedness has a positive and
significant (pb0.10 and pb0.05, respectively) impact on the
survival rates of IJVs, providing support for Hypothesis 2.
Model 4 of Table 3 further adds Chinese parent–IJV product
relatedness to the base model. Chinese parent–IJV relatedness
has no significant effect on IJV survival, although the sign is in
the hypothesized direction. Thus Hypothesis 2 is supported for
the Japanese parents but not for the Chinese parents.
Model 4 of Table 2 and Model 5 of Table 3 enter all
independent variables as the baseline model for the tests on
Hypotheses 3a–4b. In these two full main-effect models, the
signs and significance of all independent variables remain
stable, as compared to those in models in which they were
entered separately, confirming the robustness of the results
reported in these models.
Model 5 of Table 2 and Model 6 of Table 3 introduce the
interaction term between Japanese parents' technological
knowledge and Japanese parents' control at IJVs (as gauged
by equity control and managerial control) to test Hypotheses 3a
and 3b. To guard against spurious significance of the interaction
results, we first checked whether the overall change in the fit of
each model was significant, as compared to their baseline full
Table 1
Descriptive statistics and correlations
Variable and definition 1038 IJVs 354 IJVs 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.
Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
1. IJV exit 0.18 0.38 0.12 0.33 – −0.07 −0.12 0.06 −0.04 −0.05 0.21 −0.10 −0.22 −0.06 0.01 −0.10
2. IJV age 6.20 2.88 6.30 3.08 −0.08 – 0.05 0.08 0.00 −0.17 −0.04 −0.05 −0.07 0.11 0.01 −0.05
3. IJV size 248 412 250 335 −0.08 0.12 – −0.05 0.22 −0.04 −0.20 0.10 0.06 0.04 −0.05 0.09
4. IJV location 0.53 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.00 0.05 −0.06 – 0.03 0.09 −0.03 0.01 0.07 0.03 0.09 0.01
5. Japanese parent's size 10,255 17,111 9654 17,260 −0.01 −0.01 0.18 −0.05 – −0.01 0.14 0.37 0.00 0.04 −0.09 −0.09
6. Japanese parent's
equity control in IJV
0.62 0.22 0.55 0.16 −0.11 −0.16 −0.01 0.16 −0.03 – 0.11 0.15 0.11 −0.01 0.05 0.04
7. Japanese parent's
managerial control in IJV
0.04 0.09 0.03 0.07 0.12 −0.09 −0.18 0.05 0.06 0.09 – 0.05 −0.05 −0.02 0.01 0.05
8. Japanese parent's
technological knowledge
0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 −0.03 0.01 0.13 −0.03 0.44 0.00 0.04 – 0.11 −0.01 0.01 0.07
9. Japanese parent–IJV
relatedness
0.66 0.47 0.73 0.44 −0.27 −0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.07 −0.05 0.10 – −0.03 −0.02 0.12
10. Chinese parent size 16,502 80,142 – 0.10 0.01
11. Chinese parent's
ownership type (SOE)





1) All descriptive statistics are reported for non-transformed values.
2) Numbers in upper part of the correlation matrix are for IJVs with Chinese partners. Numbers in lower part of the correlation matrix are for all IJVs.
3) Significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed test) when Pearson correlations N0.108 or b−0.108 for upper part of the correlation matrix and N0.062 or b−0.062 for lower
part of the correlation matrix.
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main-effect models, after the inclusion of each interaction term.
A significant change in chi-square suggests that the inclusion of
an interaction term is a significant improvement over the base-
line model.
As shown in Table 2, Model 5 has significant incremental
chi-square. Correspondingly, the coefficient estimate of the
interaction term of Japanese parents' technological knowledge
and Japanese parents' equity control in Model 5 is significant
(pb0.10) and negatively signed, indicating that the survival rate
of an IJV improves when higher levels of technological knowl-
edge are coupled with higher levels of equity control from the
same parent. Similarly, the coefficient estimate of the
technological knowledge–managerial control interaction term
is negative and significant (pb0.10). Both Hypotheses 3a and
3b are supported in the full sample with respect to the Japanese
parents. In the sub-sample (Model 6 of Table 3) that includes
Chinese parent information, however, the coefficient estimates
for these two interaction terms are not statistically significant.
Model 6 of Table 2 and Model 7 of Table 3 introduce the
interaction term between Japanese parent–IJV product relat-
edness and Japanese parents' control over the IJV to test
Hypotheses 4a and 4b. As shown in Table 2, only the interaction
term between Japanese equity ownership level and Japanese
parent–IJV relatedness is significant (pb0.10). The negative
sign of this interaction term indicates that the survival rate of an
IJV improves if a Japanese parent assumes a high level of equity
ownership in the IJV when the IJV is product-related to the
parent. In the sub-sample (Model 7 of Table 3), however, the
coefficient estimate of this interaction term is not statistically
significant. Thus Hypothesis 4a is partially supported with
respect to the Japanese parents. The interaction term between
Japanese expatriates and Japanese parent–IJV relatedness is
statistically insignificant in both tables, lending no support for
Hypothesis 4b.
Finally, Model 8 of Table 3 tests Hypotheses 4a and 4b on the
Chinese parent by adding the interaction term of Chinese
parent–IJV product relatedness and the Japanese parent's con-
trol over the IJV. Only the interaction term between Japanese
expatriates (which can be interpreted as the reciprocal of
Chinese managerial control) and Chinese parent–IJV related-
ness is significant. The positive sign (pb0.10) of this interaction
term indicates that the survival rate of an IJV increases if the
Japanese parent assumes a low level of managerial control over
the IJV—or in other words, if the Chinese parent assumes a high
level of managerial control—when the IJV is product-related to
the Chinese parent. Thus Hypothesis 4b is supported for the
Chinese parents.
4. Discussion
This study aims to examine the effects of technological
knowledge, parent–IJV relatedness, and parent control on the
Table 2
Cox regression on 1038 Japanese IJVs in China a, b, c, d
Variable Exit=1 (N=1038, 187 exits)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
1. IJV size d −0.28⁎⁎⁎ −0.28⁎⁎⁎ −0.28⁎⁎ −0.27⁎⁎⁎ −0.26⁎⁎⁎ −0.26⁎⁎⁎
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
2. IJV location −0.17 −0.17 −0.07 −0.07 −0.07 −0.07
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
3. Japanese parent's size d 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.06
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
4. Japanese parent's equity control
in IJV
−0.29 −0.28 −0.11 −0.11 0.42 0.37
(0.37) (0.37) (0.36) (0.36) (0.44) (0.44)
5. Japanese parent's managerial
control in IJV
1.08⁎⁎ 1.24⁎⁎ 0.89⁎ 1.06⁎ 2.29⁎⁎⁎ 0.58
(0.53) (0.56) (0.52) (0.57) (0.75) (0.69)
6. Japanese parent's technological
knowledge
−0.04 −0.03 0.18⁎ −0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.10) (0.04)
7. Japanese parent–IJV relatedness −0.97⁎⁎⁎ −0.97⁎⁎⁎ −1.02⁎⁎⁎ −0.31
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.46)
















Log-likelihood −1111.23 −1110.65 −1092.71 −1092.34 −1088.16 −1090.09
Model chi-square 50.72⁎⁎⁎ 51.88⁎⁎⁎ 87.77⁎⁎⁎ 88.50⁎⁎⁎ 96.86⁎⁎⁎ 93.00⁎⁎⁎
Incremental chi-square 8.36⁎⁎ 4.50⁎
a Fixed effects for 2 digit SIC industries of entry were included in the models, but are not reported in the table.
b ⁎⁎⁎pb .01; ⁎⁎pb .05; ⁎pb .10; all two-tailed tests.
c Cell entries are unstandardized coefficient estimates. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
d Logarithmic transformation.
1172 D. Xu, J.W. Lu / Journal of Business Research 60 (2007) 1166–1176
survival of IJVs by combining the knowledge-based and insti-
tutional perspectives. To this end, both the main effects of
technological knowledge and parent–IJV relatedness and their
interaction effects with parent control were explored. The inves-
tigation was implemented with a sample of 1038 Japanese joint
ventures in China. Our theoretical hypotheses in this paper
received reasonable empirical support.
Japanese parents' technological knowledge was negatively
signed, indicating a positive effect on IJV survival, but the
variable was statistically insignificant. This finding is not
entirely inconsistent with prior studies. As argued by Meyer
(2004), knowledge transfer from parent company to an IJV is
neither automatic nor guaranteed. Research indicates that
successful knowledge transfer is dependent on various contin-
gency factors (Bjorkman et al., 2004; Lu and Hébert, 2005; Luo
et al., 2001), such as parent control—a condition we explored in
this study.
The support for a positive performance effect of foreign
parent–IJV product relatedness, and the lack of evidence for
this effect with respect to local parent–IJV relatedness, suggest
that the former plays a major role in the transfer of industry-
relevant knowledge. Taking the context of our research setting,
Japanese IJVs in China, into consideration, the importance of
foreign parent–IJV relatedness indicates that foreign parents are
the main contributors of core competences to IJVs in devel-
oping countries, and that such contribution is crucial for the
survival of these IJVs. Consistent with the findings by Luo
(2002) in a sample of IJVs in China established by parent firms
from other countries, this study alerts MNEs to the risks of
diversifying into product-unrelated business segments in an
increasingly competitive emerging market.
With regard to parent control, foreign equity control had no
significant effect, while foreign managerial control through
assigning expatriates to the IJV was inversely related to IJV
Table 3
Cox regression on 354 Japanese IJVs in China a, b, c, d
Variable Exit=1 (N=354, 44 exits)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
1. IJV size d −0.34⁎⁎ −0.31⁎⁎ −0.32⁎⁎ −0.32⁎⁎ −0.28⁎⁎ −0.28⁎⁎ −0.29⁎⁎ −0.34⁎⁎
(0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
2. IJV location 0.14 0.16 0.23 0.18 0.26 0.24 0.29 0.40
(0.31) (0.31) (0.32) (0.31) (0.32) (0.33) (0.32) (0.33)
3. Japanese parent's size d 0.18 0.24⁎ 0.12 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.18
(0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
4. Japanese parent's equity
control in IJV
0.09 0.41 0.30 −0.10 0.39 −0.33 0.66 0.18
(1.02) (1.03) (0.99) (1.03) (1.00) (1.19) (1.31) (1.13)
5. Japanese parent's managerial
control in IJV
1.78 1.87 2.00 2.18⁎ 2.36⁎ 2.93 1.66 −1.61
(1.22) (1.23) (1.22) (1.28) (1.25) (2.29) (2.39) (3.17)
6. Chinese parent's size d −0.18⁎ −0.18⁎⁎ −0.14 −0.16⁎ −0.12 −0.12 −0.13 −0.11
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10)
7. Chinese parent's ownership
type (SOE)
−0.01 −0.01 0.03 −0.01 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03
(0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.36) (0.35) (0.36)
8. Japanese parent's technological
knowledge
−0.16 −0.13 −0.52 −0.14 −0.12
(0.10) (0.10) (0.38) (0.11) (0.10)
9. Japanese parent–IJV relatedness −0.84⁎⁎ −0.78⁎⁎ −0.74⁎⁎ −0.51 −0.71⁎⁎
(0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (1.08) (0.35)
10. Chinese parent–IJV relatedness −0.56 −0.50 −0.53 −0.49 −1.96
(0.37) (0.38) (0.39) (0.38) (1.50)
























Log-likelihood −204.50 −202.99 −201.46 −203.30 −199.46 −198.82 −199.36 −197.54
Model chi-square 31.37⁎⁎⁎ 34.40⁎⁎⁎ 37.46⁎⁎⁎ 33.77⁎⁎⁎ 41.46⁎⁎⁎ 42.74⁎⁎⁎ 41.66⁎⁎⁎ 45.30⁎⁎⁎
Incremental chi-square 1.28 0.20 3.84⁎
a Fixed effects for 2 digit SIC industries of entry were included in the models, but are not reported in the table.
b ⁎⁎⁎pb .01; ⁎⁎pb .05; ⁎⁎⁎pb .10; all two-tailed tests.
c Cell entries are unstandardized coefficient estimates. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
d Logarithmic transformation.
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survival, in most of the models. The latter contradicts the
findings of Killing (1983), who had a sample of joint ventures
established in developed countries. Given that Japanese firms
have traditionally assumed a high control mode in developing
countries (Beamish, 1993) but achieved unsatisfactory perfor-
mance (Lu, 2000), findings obtained here provide supporting
evidence for a weakening of the link—between foreign control
and IJV survival—when the focus shifts from developed
markets to developing countries.
More importantly, the results have confirmed our major the-
oretical conjecture, namely, there are interaction effects between
technological knowledge and parent–IJV relatedness on one
hand, and parent control over the IJVon the other. A combination
of higher levels of technological knowledge possessed by the
foreign parent and higher levels of foreign parent control, either
equity or managerial, contributes to higher IJV survival rates.
Prior research has emphasized that successful knowledge
transfer is dependent on various contingency factors (Bjorkman
et al., 2004; Lu and Hébert, 2005). Our study has identified
parent control as one of these conditions. An important theo-
retical implication of this finding is that institutional processes
can serve as a catalyst for mobilizing knowledge-based orga-
nizational resources. In the case of IJVs, the effect of techno-
logical technologies—a critical resource possessed by MNEs—
was amplified when the rules, norms, and processes in the IJV
are shaped by foreign parents. Thus we confirm the strategic
value of a fit between the source of external resources and the
source of institutional pressures (Oliver, 1991, 1997). Our con-
tribution is in extending this view to technological and knowl-
edge-based resources, and to organizations spanning different
national institutions.
Parent control also interacts with parent–IJV product related-
ness. Specifically, there is a positive interaction effect between
Japanese parent–IJV product relatedness and equity control by
the Japanese parent on IJV survival. Meanwhile, results in
Table 3 can be interpreted as pointing to a positive interaction
effect between Chinese parent–IJV relatedness and managerial
control by the Chinese parent on the IJV. In other words,
Chinese parents make more contributions when the IJV is inside
their industry segments, and when they exercise managerial
control as opposed to equity control over the IJV. Although not
a major thrust in this study, the latter finding, along with the
negative performance effect of Japanese expatriates discussed
earlier, may have identified an interesting phenomenon for
future research to focus on. It may be that the greatest con-
tribution made by local Chinese partner is the personal guanxi
(Ramasamy et al., 2006) that Chinese managers bring to an IJV,
namely their connections with clients, suppliers, and govern-
ment agencies overseeing a particular industry segment.
Interpretations of the results should take into account
limitations in the analysis. The most notable of these is the
fact that the empirical results in this study were derived from a
sample of Japanese IJVs in China, and hence the concern that
the findings might be country-specific. For example, Japanese
firms in general are more advanced in technological capabilities
compared to their Chinese counterparts. This could be an
underlying reason for the positive association between Japanese
parent–IJV product relatedness and IJV survival rates, and for
the significant interaction effects with respect to Japanese parent
control. This pattern may not hold for foreign investments from
a different home country or for IJVs established in a different
host country. Therefore, future studies should use samples of
foreign firms or IJVs from other countries to extend the gen-
eralizability of findings in this paper.
Another limitation of the study is the assumption that IJV
termination is an indicator of IJV failure. Although this is a
conventional assumption in many empirical studies on IJVs
over the last three decades, recent studies have shown that IJVs
can also terminate because of the fulfillment of one or more
partners' strategic objectives (Yan and Zeng, 1999). Future
studies need to investigate the outcomes of IJV termination to
derive a more accurate measure of IJV success or failure.
Finally, this study did not test the effect of local parents'
technological knowledge on IJV survival due to the lack of
this information in our dataset. This may not be a major issue
in this study because it is quite likely that the Japanese parents
are the major contributors in terms of technological knowl-
edge in Sino–Japanese joint ventures. However, it will be
useful to test this possible effect in future studies, especially in
empirical settings in which both parties can contribute such
knowledge.
5. Conclusions
This study extends understanding of the relationships among
parent firm technological knowledge, parent–IJV relatedness,
parent control, and IJV survival by combining the knowledge-
based perspective and institutional theory, and by adopting a
contingency approach to these relationships. Its analytical
framework and empirical findings have important implications
for both academics and managers.
Product relatedness between an IJVand its foreign parent has
a positive influence on the likelihood of IJV survival, while
product relatedness between an IJVand its local parent does not
contribute to IJV survival. These findings highlight the
importance to examine the differential effects of different
types of parent–IJV relatedness.
Foreign managerial control has a negative main effect on
the survival chances of IJVs in China. The negative association
of the use of Japanese expatriates with IJV survival, and its
negative interaction effect with foreign parent–IJV related-
ness, indicate a weakening of the link—between foreign con-
trol and good IJV performance—when the focus shifts from
developed countries to developing countries. These findings
illustrate the importance of localization in IJVs in developing
countries.
Finally, parent control has a positive interaction effect with
both technological knowledge and parent–IJV product related-
ness. These significant interaction effects highlight the value of
a contingency approach in the study of control–performance
relationships. It also indicates that managers need to design
control mechanisms in IJVs with specific considerations to
resource contributions from IJV partners and their respective
institutional influences.
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